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______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Michael Rinaldi, who at all relevant times 
was an inmate in custody at United States Penitentiary, 
Lewisburg (“Lewisburg” or the “Institution”), appeals the 
District Court’s dismissal of his complaint1 alleging that the 
                                                          
 1 The District Court considered the Government’s 
“Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary 
Judgment,” JA 68, as one “for dismissal primarily under Rule 
12(b)(6),” Rinaldi v. United States, 2015 WL 2131208, at *1 
n.1 (M.D. Pa. May 7, 2015), and accepted as true the factual 
allegations in Rinaldi’s complaint.  In dismissing Rinaldi’s 
claims and entering judgment in the Government’s favor based 
on an affirmative defense, the District Court relied in part on 
prison records and an affidavit and to that extent construed the 
Government’s motion as one for summary judgment.  Id. at *7-
8, *19.  As we have observed in past cases, where a defendant 
moves to dismiss based on a failure-to-exhaust defense and 
“the exhaustion issue turns on [] indisputably authentic 
documents related to [the inmate’s] grievances,” we may 
consider those documents “without converting [a motion to 
dismiss] to a motion for summary judgment,” Spruill v. Gillis, 
372 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004), although different treatment 
may be warranted where the court considers other types of 
evidence, see Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 
2018) (affirming order on defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment for failure-to-exhaust based on prison records and an 
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conduct of various personnel violated his constitutional and 
statutory rights.  His appeal requires us to resolve three matters 
of first impression for our Court: (1) what showing an inmate 
must make to establish that administrative remedies were not 
“available” within the meaning of the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act (“PLRA”); (2) whether the PLRA’s exhaustion 
requirement is satisfied where a prison administrator elects to 
resolve a procedurally improper administrative request on the 
merits; and (3) whether a prison’s housing and cellmate 
assignments meet the discretionary function exception to the 
Federal Tort Claims Act’s limited waiver of sovereign 
immunity.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 
District Court’s dismissal of Rinaldi’s complaint in part and 
will vacate and remand in part.   
 
I. Factual Background 
 
 Between November 2011 and 2012, while housed at 
Lewisburg, Rinaldi filed a number of administrative requests, 
including one related to an alleged assault and one related to 
alleged retaliation.  He initiated his assault claim with an 
“informal resolution,”2 dated January 29, 2012, alleging that 
                                                          
affidavit without discussing when such a motion may be 
construed as a motion to dismiss).  In any event, we likewise 
will accept Rinaldi’s factual allegations as true for purposes of 
this appeal.  See Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 
639, 642 n.1 (2008).    
 
 2 As explained in greater detail below, an “informal 
resolution” is the first step that must be taken by an inmate in 
the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) as part of its 4-step grievance 
process.  The subsequent steps are the filing of a formal 
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he had been assaulted by a previous cellmate (Cellmate #1), 
and “requesting the institution discontinue its practice of 
forcing inmates to cell together [] regardless of their 
compatibility.”  JA 160.  On February 1, after that informal 
request was denied, Rinaldi filed a formal request (the “Assault 
Request”), which the Institution eventually denied on the 
ground that there was “no basis for [Rinaldi’s] accusations.”  
JA 165.  
  
 The following day, February 2, Rinaldi was transferred 
to another unit.  According to Rinaldi’s complaint, Appellee 
Counselor Baysore had previously warned Rinaldi that unless 
he stopped filing requests, “she would have him moved to a 
different unit and placed in a cell with an inmate who was 
known for assaulting his cellmates,” and Appellee Officer Gee, 
who conducted the transfer, told Rinaldi that the reason he was 
being moved was because he “didn’t listen” to those warnings.  
JA 61.  Despite his protests, Rinaldi was transferred and placed 
in a cell with a new cellmate (Cellmate #2), who, Rinaldi 
alleges, threatened him by informing Lewisburg personnel, 
including Officer Gee and Counselor Baysore, “that if Rinaldi 
were placed in the cell he would kill [him].”  JA 61.  Over the 
course of the next three weeks, Rinaldi asserts he “suffered cuts 
and bruises and emotional distress” from several physical 
altercations with Cellmate #2.  JA 61.   
 
Rinaldi sought administrative relief for the alleged 
retaliatory transfer on February 2, but because he allegedly was 
                                                          
“request” at the institution, an appeal to the BOP Regional 
Director, and a final appeal to the General Counsel of the BOP.  
See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.13-.18. 
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concerned about the risk of further retaliation, he opted not to 
file an informal resolution or initial retaliatory transfer request 
directly with the Institution.  Instead, he followed the 
procedure for “Sensitive” requests, filing this claim (the 
“Retaliation Request”) directly with the Regional Director.  
According to BOP records, the Retaliation Request was 
rejected as procedurally improper with directions to first file it 
at the Institution, which Rinaldi declined to do.3   
 
 Separately, Rinaldi also sought to obtain administrative 
relief for the assault by Cellmate #2.  Although Rinaldi was 
required to file an informal resolution and formal request with 
the Institution,4 he did not do so.  Rather, as he was then poised 
to appeal the denial of his original Assault Request (concerning 
Cellmate #1) to the Regional Director, he simply incorporated 
allegations as to both Cellmate #1 and Cellmate #2 into his 
appeal.  As a result, the Regional Director could have rejected 
that appeal, at least as to Cellmate #2, on procedural grounds 
                                                          
3 There is some ambiguity in the record as to whether 
Rinaldi took a further appeal of the rejection by the Regional 
Director to the General Counsel.  However, the Government 
does not raise and thus has waived this issue as a basis for 
Rinaldi’s failure to exhaust, instead resting its argument 
exclusively on Rinaldi’s failure to refile the “Sensitive” request 
with the Institution.  See United States v. Albertson, 645 F.3d 
191, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 
4 The assault by Cellmate #2 was “unrelated” to the 
assault by Cellmate #1 and thus was required to be filed as a 
separate grievance.  28 C.F.R. § 542.14(c)(2); see id.                       
§ 542.15(b)(2). 
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for failure to exhaust because his claim as to Cellmate #2 was 
never presented to the Institution in the first instance.  Instead, 
however, he issued a decision that acknowledged that the 
appeal raised claims concerning the assaults by Cellmates #1 
and #2 and rejected both claims on the merits.  As the Regional 
Director put it: 
 
You appeal the response from the Warden at 
USP Lewisburg and claim you were forced into 
a cell with another inmate who you allege 
threatened to kill you prior to being placed in the 
same cell.  You also state you were once 
assaulted by a previous cellmate and received 
injuries. . . [T]here is no record of you being 
assaulted by your previous or current cellmate. . 
. Accordingly, your appeal is denied.   
 
JA 168.5    
 
II. Procedural History 
 
 Unable to obtain redress through the BOP grievance 
process, Rinaldi, initially proceeding pro se, filed a complaint 
in the Middle District of Pennsylvania raising three claims 
relevant to this appeal: (1) a First Amendment claim based on 
the retaliatory conduct alleged in the Retaliation Request; (2) 
an Eighth Amendment claim based on the cell placement and 
                                                          
 5 It appears that Rinaldi’s further appeal to the General 
Counsel, though summarily denied, was also denied on the 
merits because the BOP database entry indicated a status code 
“DNY,” meaning a “request or appeal denied substantially in 
full.”  JA 170, 179.   
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resulting attack by Cellmate #2 alleged in his appeal of the 
Assault Request; and (3) a claim pursuant to the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346, against the United 
States for negligently placing Rinaldi with a cellmate that 
prison personnel knew or should have known would assault 
him.6   
 
                                                          
 6 Rinaldi also raised a claim pursuant to the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et 
seq., based on his inability to attend congregational prayer 
while housed in the Special Management Unit at Lewisburg, 
as well as a claim construed as a Bivens claim based on a 
violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the United States 
Constitution.  See Bivens v. Six Unknown Names Agents of Fed. 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Rinaldi, 2015 WL 
2131208, at *10, 16-17.  The District Court dismissed 
Rinaldi’s RFRA claim with leave to amend, explaining to 
Rinaldi that he was required to allege the personal involvement 
of each defendant, but Rinaldi declined to file an amended 
complaint and did not appeal the denial of his RFRA claim.  
Between the District Court’s order and the filing of this appeal, 
we held in Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 305 (3d 
Cir. 2016), that Bivens did not extend to Free Exercise claims 
and Rinaldi concedes in his Reply brief in this appeal that Mack 
forecloses his Bivens claim.  Rinaldi also requests for the first 
time in his Reply that, in view of Mack, we remand to give him 
the opportunity to amend his RFRA claim—the very 
opportunity he passed up when offered by the District Court.  
We will deny that request because “the courts of appeals will 
not consider arguments raised on appeal for the first time in 
a reply brief.”  Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 
186, 204-5 n. 29 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).  
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 The District Court granted the Government’s “Motion 
to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary 
Judgment,” concluding (1) the First Amendment claim was 
barred by the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), because Rinaldi 
had declined to file his Retaliation Request with the Institution 
and thus had not exhausted the Retaliation Request; (2) the 
Eighth Amendment claim covering the assault by Cellmate #2 
was likewise unexhausted because Rinaldi failed to file an 
initial request and raised it only in the appeal of his Assault 
Request; and (3) the Court did not have jurisdiction over the 
FTCA claim because cellmate assignments fall within the 
discretionary function exception to the FTCA’s waiver of 
sovereign immunity.7  Rinaldi v. United States, No. 13-cv-450, 
2015 WL 2131208, at *5-8 (M.D. Pa. May 7, 2015); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2680(a). 
 
 After appointing pro bono counsel on appeal, we 
directed the parties to address, among other things, whether 
Rinaldi failed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding 
his First and Eighth Amendment claims and the applicability 
                                                          
 7 While the District Court concluded, based on the 
discretionary function exception, that it “lack[ed] jurisdiction 
over Plaintiff’s claims against the United States and all other 
Defendants in their official capacity,” Rinaldi, 2015 WL 
2131208, at *6, it properly concluded that it had jurisdiction 
over Rinaldi’s claims against the defendants in their individual 
capacities.  See Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 717 (3d 
Cir. 1979); Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, 
A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(noting that a Bivens action can be maintained against a 
defendant in his or her individual capacity only). 
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of the discretionary function exception to Rinaldi’s FTCA 
claim.   
 
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.          
§ 1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
exercise plenary review over both the exhaustion 
determination, Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 
2004), and the applicability of the discretionary function 
exception to the wavier of sovereign immunity, Mitchell v. 
United States, 225 F.3d 361, 362 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
IV. Discussion 
 
 Below we consider whether Rinaldi exhausted his First 
Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims before turning to 
Rinaldi’s FTCA claim. 
 
A. Exhaustion under the PLRA 
 
 Congress enacted the PLRA to reduce the “disruptive 
tide of frivolous prisoner litigation.”  Woodford v. Ngo, 548 
U.S. 81, 97 (2006).  In contrast to its precursor, the Civil Rights 
of Institutionalized Persons Act, § 7, 94 Stat. 352 (1980), 
which had a “weak exhaustion provision,” the PLRA 
“invigorated” the administrative remedy of exhaustion, 
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 84, by providing: 
 
[n]o action shall be brought with respect to 
prison conditions under Section 1983 of this title, 
or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined 
in any jail . . . until such administrative remedies 
as are available are exhausted. 
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42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added).  Exhaustion is thus a 
non-jurisdictional prerequisite to an inmate bringing suit and, 
for that reason, as we held in Small v. Camden County, it 
constitutes a “‘threshold issue that courts must address to 
determine whether litigation is being conducted in the right 
forum at the right time.’”  728 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 272 (5th Cir. 2010)).  
We make that determination by “evaluating compliance with 
the prison’s specific grievance procedures,” Drippe v. 
Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 781 (3d Cir. 2010), and analyzing 
whether the procedures were “available” to the inmate.  Small, 
728 F.3d at 269, 271; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 
 
While Small made clear that factual disputes relevant to 
exhaustion may be resolved by a district judge without the 
participation of a jury, id. at 271, we recently clarified that, 
before engaging in such fact-finding, the judge must provide 
the parties with “some form of notice . . . and an opportunity to 
respond,” although we left the exact form of this notice to “the 
discretion of the district court [] on a case-by-case basis.”  
Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2018).  At a 
minimum, however, the court must “notify the parties that it 
will consider exhaustion in its role as a fact finder under 
Small,” and, although live testimony is not necessarily 
required, it also “must at least provide the parties with an 
opportunity to submit materials relevant to exhaustion that are 
not already before it.”  Id; see Small, 728 F.3d at 269. 
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1. Rinaldi’s First Amendment Retaliation  
Claim  
 
 Rinaldi argues that his First Amendment claim should 
not have been dismissed on exhaustion grounds because the 
safety risks of filing directly with the Institution rendered that 
administrative remedy unavailable.  Because we must measure 
whether Rinaldi exhausted his administrative remedies against 
the yardstick of the grievance procedures set forth in the 
relevant BOP regulations, see 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.13-.18; 
Drippe, 604 F.3d at 781, we will first summarize (a) the 
relevant administrative remedies under BOP regulations and 
(b) the case law relevant to the availability of those remedies 
under the PLRA before addressing (c) the showing an inmate 
must make to prove unavailability, and (d) whether remand is 
necessary to determine if Rinaldi can make that showing here.  
   
(a) Exhaustion of BOP Administrative 
 Remedies 
 
 As a general matter, inmates must (1) attempt an 
informal resolution with staff at the institution, id. § 542.13(a); 
(2) file a formal complaint with the institution, id. § 542.14(c); 
(3) file an appeal to the appropriate Regional Director if the 
inmate is not satisfied with the institution’s response to the 
formal complaint, id. § 542.15(a); and (4) file another appeal 
to the General Counsel if the inmate is not satisfied with the 
Regional Director’s response to the appeal, id.  However, 
where an inmate “reasonably believes the issue [that is the 
subject of his grievance] is sensitive and the inmate’s safety or 
well-being would be placed in danger if the Request became 
known at the institution,” the inmate may proceed directly to 
Step (3) by “submit[ing] the Request directly to the appropriate 
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Regional Director.”  Id. § 542.14(d).  The inmate must “clearly 
mark ‘Sensitive’ upon the Request and explain, in writing, the 
reason for not submitting the Request at the institution.”  Id.  If 
the appropriate reviewer does not agree that the request is 
“Sensitive,” the regulations provide that “the inmate shall be 
advised in writing” that the “Request will not be accepted,” and 
the inmate then “may pursue the matter by submitting a [] . . . 
Request locally” with the institution.  Id. 
 
 Here, Rinaldi considered his Retaliation Request a 
“Sensitive” request and therefore filed it with the Regional 
Director in the first instance.  As discussed above, however, 
the Regional Director rejected it on the procedural ground that 
Rinaldi should have filed first with Lewisburg.8  That tees up 
                                                          
 8 It appears that there are two potentially applicable 
regulations—and, by extension, two applicable procedures—
when a “Sensitive” request is rejected.  See 28 C.F.R. 
§ 542.14(d) (governing “Sensitive” requests); id. § 542.17(c) 
(governing all rejections including “a rejection on the basis of 
[the] exception [for ‘Sensitive’ issues]”).  We will assume for 
purposes of this appeal that those regulations required Rinaldi 
to refile at the Institution upon receipt of the rejection because 
Rinaldi himself adopts that position and raises no arguments to 
the contrary.  We note, however, that § 542.17(c) is not a model 
of clarity, particularly when viewed together with 
§ 542.14(d)(1).  While § 542.14(d)(1) directs what inmates 
“shall” do after a “Sensitive” request is rejected, it also states 
that inmates “may pursue the matter by submitting an 
Administrative Remedy Request locally to the Warden,” 
suggesting that refiling at the institution is a permissible 
alternative to direct appeal pursuant to § 542.17(c).  Id. 
§ 542.14(d)(1) (emphasis added).  Similarly, § 542.17(c) 
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the first exhaustion issue we confront today: whether Rinaldi 
was required to submit his Retaliation Request to the 
Institution to satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement 
before filing his First Amendment claim in federal court or 
whether he was relieved of that requirement because the 
opportunity to file with the Institution was not “available.”  42 
U.S.C. § 1997e(a).    
 
(b) Unavailability of Administrative 
Remedies  
 
 The PLRA requires only “proper exhaustion,” meaning 
exhaustion of those administrative remedies that are 
“available.”  Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93.  In its recent decision 
in Ross v. Blake, the Supreme Court identified “three kinds of 
circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although 
officially on the books,” is not “available” because it is “not 
                                                          
provides that an “inmate may appeal [a] rejection,” and 
specifically provides that the regulation covers rejections of 
“Sensitive” requests.  As for § 542.17(c), the only qualifier to 
permission to appeal directly is that “the inmate is not given an 
opportunity to correct the defect and resubmit.”  Id. 
§ 542.17(c).  But it is not apparent what “defect” can be 
“correct[ed]” when an inmate in good faith believes that the 
request is indeed “Sensitive” and therefore warrants a direct 
appeal.  Because, “under § 1997e(a), the warden is responsible 
for the grievance system . . . he or she may alter the grievance 
system to require more (or less) of inmates by way of 
exhaustion,” Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235, and in view of the 
ambiguity in § 542.17(c), wardens and the BOP itself may 
wish to provide guidance.   
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capable of use to obtain relief”: (1) when “it operates as a 
simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently 
unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates”; (2) when 
it is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable 
of use,” such as when no ordinary prisoner can discern or 
navigate it; or (3) when “prison administrators thwart inmates 
from taking advantage of a grievance process through 
machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.”  136 S. Ct. 
1850, 1859-60 (2016).    
 
 We too have encountered circumstances in which a 
grievance process, though “officially on the books,” Ross, 136 
S. Ct. at 1859, is in reality incapable of use such that the 
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement must be deemed satisfied.  In 
Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2002), for example, we 
rejected the prison’s affirmative defense of failure to exhaust 
where the plaintiff alleged he was given misleading filing 
instructions, resulting in a procedural default, and argued 
“essentially that officials in the security department of the 
prison thwarted his efforts to exhaust his administrative 
remedies.”  Id. at 113.  And more recently, in Robinson v. 
Superintendent Rockview SCI, we held that the prison 
“rendered its administrative remedies unavailable to [the 
plaintiff] when it failed to timely (by its own procedural rules) 
respond to his grievance and then repeatedly ignored his 
follow-up requests for a decision on his claim.”  831 F.3d 148, 
154 (3d Cir. 2016).  In such circumstances, “filing suit [was the 
plaintiff’s] only method to advance his claim.”  Id. 
 
 Rinaldi now asks us to recognize another circumstance 
in which the grievance process is unavailable, i.e., where an 
inmate is deterred from pursuing an administrative grievance 
by a prison official’s serious threats of substantial retaliation—
16 
 
a circumstance that Rinaldi contends falls squarely within 
Ross’s third category because a prisoner’s ability to take 
advantage of the grievance process has then been “thwarted” 
by prison administrators “through . . . intimidation.”  Ross, 136 
S. Ct. at 1860.   
 
We agree that serious threats of substantial retaliation 
can trigger this third category of unavailability, and thus join 
our Sister Circuits who have held, even before Ross, that 
administrative remedies are not “available” under the PLRA 
where a prison official inhibits an inmate from resorting to 
them through serious threats of retaliation and bodily harm.9  
See McBride v. Lopez, 807 F.3d 982, 986-87 (9th Cir. 2015); 
Tuckel v. Grover, 660 F.3d 1249, 1252-53 (10th Cir. 2011); 
Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1084-86 (11th Cir. 2008); 
Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006); Hemphill v. 
New York, 380 F.3d 680, 686-87 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated on 
other grounds as recognized in Williams v. Correction Officer 
Priatno, 829 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 
As the Tenth Circuit eloquently explained in Tuckel v. 
Grover, it is “difficult to accept the proposition that an 
administrative remedy is available in any meaningful sense if 
its use will result in serious retaliation and bodily harm.”  660 
                                                          
9 Given our conclusion that this circumstance falls 
within the third category described in Ross, we do not have 
occasion to address, as have some of our Sister Circuits, 
whether Ross’s three categories are exhaustive or merely 
illustrative.  See, e.g., Andres v. Marshall, 867 F.3d 1076, 1078 
(9th Cir. 2017) (describing the three categories as “non-
exhaustive”); Williams v. Corr. Officer Priatno, 829 F.3d 118, 
124 (2d Cir. 2016) (same). 
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F.3d at 1252.  To the contrary, threats made by prison officials 
that inhibit an inmate from utilizing an administrative process 
“disrupt the operation and frustrate the purposes of the 
administrative remedies process enough that the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement does not allow them” and thus lift the 
exhaustion requirement as to that part of the process.  Id. at 
1253 (quoting Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d at 1085).  This 
approach not only is consistent with the plain language of the 
PLRA, which requires only exhaustion of administrative 
remedies “as are available,” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), but also is 
“faithful to the underlying purposes of the PLRA,” id. at 1253, 
as it “reduces any incentive that prison officials otherwise 
might have to use threats to prevent inmates from exhausting 
their administrative remedies” and “thereby safeguards the 
benefits of the administrative review process for everyone,” 
Turner, 541 F.3d at 1085. 
 
With Ross, the Supreme Court too has recognized that 
“intimidation” by prison officials can “thwart inmates from 
taking advantage of a grievance process” and thus render that 
process “unavailable.”  136 S. Ct. at 1860.  But the question 
remains what showing an inmate must make to establish such 
“intimidation” and defeat a failure-to-exhaust defense: Must he 
show (1) that, objectively, an inmate of reasonable fortitude 
would be deterred from filing a grievance; (2) that, 
subjectively, he himself was deterred from filing a grievance; 
or (3) that both an objective and subjective test have been 
satisfied?  To that question we now turn. 
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(c) The Showing Required to Prove 
Unavailability 
 
The burden to plead and prove failure to exhaust as an 
affirmative defense rests on the defendant.  Ray v. Kertes, 285 
F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002).  But once the defendant has 
established that the inmate failed to resort to administrative 
remedies, the onus falls on the inmate to show that such 
remedies were unavailable to him.  Tuckel, 660 F.3d at 1253-
54. 
 
To determine what showing is required to establish 
unavailability based on “intimidation,” we find helpful 
guidance in the reasoning of other Courts of Appeals.  In 
Turner v. Burnside, the Eleventh Circuit held that an inmate 
must show both that “the threat actually did deter the plaintiff 
inmate from lodging a grievance or pursuing a particular part 
of the process”; and that “the threat is one that would deter a 
reasonable inmate of ordinary firmness and fortitude from 
lodging a grievance or pursuing the part of the grievance 
process that the inmate failed to exhaust.”  541 F.3d at 1085.  
The Tenth Circuit has also embraced the “two-prong analysis 
in Turner . . . as the best model” for the “showing necessary to 
defeat a failure-to-exhaust defense,” Tuckel, 660 F.3d at 1253-
54, explaining that the subjective element ensures that the 
grievance process was perceived as unavailable by this 
plaintiff, i.e., “that he was actually deterred,” while the 
objective element “ensures that inmates cannot easily 
circumvent the exhaustion requirement” and thus “only threats 
that are sufficiently serious and retaliatory acts that are severe 
enough to deter a reasonable inmate will result in an 
administrative remedy becoming unavailable for PLRA 
purposes,” id. at 1254.  The Ninth Circuit, too, has embraced 
19 
 
Turner as “straightforward and conceptually simple to apply.”  
See McBride, 807 F.3d at 987-88.   
 
 We also find the Turner test a sensible one.10  The 
objective component is of chief importance because it 
maintains the exhaustion requirement for the vast majority of 
claims and allows otherwise unexhausted claims to proceed 
only in the exceptional circumstance where the facts alleged 
would reasonably give rise to a substantial fear of serious harm.  
As the Tuckel Court explained, the objective requirement 
allows courts to easily weed out suits that attempt to 
circumvent the PLRA, such as where “a threat . . . was 
allegedly made years prior to the inmate’s suit” or “an inmate 
is no longer held in the prison in which he experienced 
retaliatory violence.”  660 F.3d at 1254.  Because 
“demonstrating that an official objectively chilled an inmate 
from relying on administrative remedies presents a significant 
challenge in any context,” the objective prong leaves “little 
incentive for an inmate to assert baseless retaliation claims 
rather than simply utilizing a grievance procedure,” id., and it 
instead filters for those threats so serious as to lead a rational 
inmate to forego the benefits of administrative review, see, 
e.g., McBride, 807 F.3d at 988 (concluding that the inmate 
failed to satisfy Turner’s objective prong where there was no 
“basis in the record from which the district court could 
determine that a reasonable prisoner of ordinary firmness 
would have understood the prison official’s actions to threaten 
                                                          
10 Indeed, federal courts are well accustomed to 
applying tests involving both an objective and subjective 
component in the prisoner litigation context.  See, e.g., Hudson 
v. McMilian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Ricks v. Shover, 981 F.2d 
468, 473-74 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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retaliation if the prisoner chose to utilize the prison’s grievance 
system”).   
 
 But the subjective component also has a role to play.  
For even though a showing that an inmate of reasonable 
fortitude would be deterred offers relevant circumstantial 
evidence of subjective deterrence, see Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 
730, 738 (2002); Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 441 (3d 
Cir. 2017), a district court may conclude—based on 
documents, affidavits, or live testimony if deemed warranted, 
see Paladino, 885 F.3d at 211—that the subjective showing has 
not been satisfied.  Evidence that an inmate continued to file 
substantially similar claims through the same grievance 
process, for example, may be sufficiently compelling to defeat 
an inmate’s assertion of subjective deterrence. 
 
 In sum, we perceive a valuable role for both the 
objective and subjective components of the Turner test and 
today adopt it as our own.  To defeat a failure-to-exhaust 
defense, an inmate must show (1) that the threat was 
sufficiently serious that it would deter a reasonable inmate of 
ordinary firmness and fortitude from lodging a grievance and 
(2) that the threat actually did deter this particular inmate.  
 
(d) Application to Rinaldi 
 
 As applied here, Rinaldi’s Retaliation Request 
unquestionably satisfies the objective test for unavailability.  
Accepting the allegation that Rinaldi’s continued resistance to 
the grievance process is what led prison authorities to house 
him with a cellmate they knew threatened to kill him, we have 
little trouble concluding that “a reasonable inmate of ordinary 
firmness and fortitude” would be “deter[red] . . .  from lodging 
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a grievance or pursuing the part of the grievance process that 
the inmate failed to exhaust.”  Turner, 541 F.3d at 1084-85.  
And the Government conceded as much at oral argument.  The 
Government disputes, however, whether Rinaldi was 
subjectively deterred.  
 
Because the District Court did not have the benefit of 
the test we announce today and because we had not yet 
clarified in Paladino what procedures are required when a 
district court must resolve factual disputes relevant to 
exhaustion, the District Court did not have occasion to 
determine whether Rinaldi made the requisite showing of 
subjective deterrence.  Nonetheless, the Government urges that 
we should affirm, rather than remand, because the record 
reflects that Rinaldi filed a number of grievances after the 
allegedly retaliatory transfer—a circumstance that the 
Government contends, in effect, negates subjective deterrence 
as a matter of law.  We are not persuaded.   
 
As the Seventh Circuit has observed, the “ability to take 
advantage of administrative grievances is not an ‘either-or’ 
proposition.  Sometimes grievances are clearly available; 
sometimes they are not; and sometimes there is a middle 
ground where, for example, a prisoner may only be able to file 
grievances on certain topics.”  Kaba, 458 F.3d at 685.  Thus, 
the court concluded, it “was unrealistic to expect [the inmate] 
to file a grievance against the very people who were 
threatening retaliation and preventing him from obtaining the 
proper forms,” and the fact that an inmate files unrelated claims 
“does not prove that remedies were available within the 
system” for purposes of exhaustion.  Id. at 685-86.  That 
observation holds true in this case, where Rinaldi’s willingness 
to file grievances concerning unrelated and far less 
22 
 
inflammatory subjects like cleaning supplies is hardly 
dispositive of whether he was subjectively deterred from 
pursuing his Retaliation Request at the Institution.  Indeed, the 
Government has not identified any subsequent grievance that 
can be characterized as substantially similar to his Retaliation 
Request. 
 
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s 
dismissal of Rinaldi’s First Amendment claim, and will 
remand for the District Court to consider subjective deterrence 
in the first instance.    
 
2. Rinaldi’s Eighth Amendment Assault 
Claim  
 
 Rinaldi also challenges the District Court’s dismissal of 
his Eighth Amendment claim for failure to exhaust.  As 
explained below, even though he did not initiate a new 
grievance for the assault by Cellmate #2 and raised that claim 
for the first time in the appeal of his original Assault Request, 
exhaustion was satisfied under our case law because the 
Regional Director denied it on the merits.11   
                                                          
 11 The Government’s suggestion that the Assault 
Request was not “fully examined” on the merits, Appellee’s 
Br. 21, is refuted by the Regional Director’s decision, which 
addressed both assaults and concluded that the appeal was 
“denied” because “there is no record of [him] being assaulted 
by [his] previous or current cellmate.”  JA 168 (emphasis 
added).  As the Government acknowledges elsewhere in its 
brief, “denials” in contrast to “rejections,” are “on the merits.”  
Appellee’s Br. 22-23.   
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 In Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2000), 
despite the fact that the inmate had not completed a necessary 
step in the Department of Corrections’ grievance process, we 
concluded that the prison had waived any exhaustion defense 
and “judicial consideration [wa]s open to [the inmate]” 
because the inmate’s “allegations [had] been fully examined 
on the merits by the ultimate administrative authority,” and 
therefore a “substantive determination [had been] made at the 
highest level.”  Id. at 281.  Likewise, in Spruill, drawing on 
principles from habeas and administrative law, we reasoned 
that whether a prisoner had “properly exhausted” a claim must 
be determined by evaluating not only “the prisoner’s 
compliance with the prison’s administrative regulations 
governing inmate grievances,” but also “the waiver, if any, of 
such regulations by prison officials.”  372 F.3d at 222.  Thus, 
even though Spruill had failed to include the name of the 
relevant prison official, we held that the grievance office’s 
acknowledgment of which prison official was involved had 
“excused any procedural defects in Spruill’s initial 
grievances.”  Id. at 234.   
 
  The Government contends in its briefing that our 
precedent was abrogated by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006).12  Quite the opposite.  In 
                                                          
 12 The Government appears of two minds on this point, 
as it indicated at oral argument that it “is not taking the position 
that . . . Spruill or Camp are called into question by Woodford 
or Ross,” and that if this Court “conclude[s] that the Regional 
Administrator did address [Rinaldi’s] . . . Eighth Amendment 
assault claim [] on the merits that it’s properly exhausted for 
purposes of Federal Court.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 42:12-22.  Having 
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Woodford, the Supreme Court resolved a split between those 
Circuits that had adopted a broader interpretation of the 
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement and those, like ours, that had 
adopted a test of “proper exhaustion,” meaning “using all steps 
that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the 
agency addresses the issues on the merits).”  548 U.S. at 90 
(citation omitted).  The Court endorsed the latter approach—
citing specifically to Spruill and even echoing our observation 
in Spruill that PLRA exhaustion should mirror the “proper 
exhaustion” requirements from both the habeas and 
administrative law contexts.  Id. at 88-89. 
    
 Although Woodford did not specifically address 
whether review on the merits of an otherwise procedurally 
defaulted claim constitutes “proper exhaustion,” the Court’s 
reference to Spruill and its reliance on principles of habeas and 
administrative law in evaluating PLRA exhaustion support that 
conclusion.13  In its habeas jurisprudence, the Court has 
                                                          
considered carefully whether Woodford and Ross alter our 
approach, we conclude they do not. 
 
13 Our dissenting colleague correctly observes that “the 
Supreme Court has not imported all [habeas and administrative 
law] principles” into PLRA exhaustion, and has rejected, for 
example, an analogy to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act’s tolling provision.  Dissent at 9 & n.6.  But the 
Court’s rejection of analogies to habeas and administrative law 
in rare and specific contexts only points up its reliance on them 
as a general matter to guide its PLRA exhaustion 
jurisprudence, and we see no reason to abjure that reliance 
here, particularly given the Court’s approving citation to 
Spruill.   
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recognized an exception to the general rule of exhaustion 
“where the State has actually passed upon the claim,” even if 
raised by the state court sua sponte.  Castille v. Peoples, 489 
U.S. 346, 351 (1989); see also Mathias v. Superintendent 
Frackville SCI, 876 F.3d 462, 480 n.6 (3d Cir. 2017).  In the 
administrative law context, it is also well settled that “when the 
agency in fact considers the issue on the merits, [the] general 
exhaustion requirement can be satisfied even if the party did 
not properly raise it,” Kennedy for President Comm. v. FEC, 
734 F.2d 1558, 1560 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1984)), and as Justice 
Breyer expressly noted in his concurrence in Ross, the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement “include[s] administrative law’s ‘well-
established exceptions to exhaustion.’”  Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 
1863 (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 103) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (citation omitted)).  Woodford thus does not 
require us to revisit Camp and Spruill, and, if anything, 
reinforces our conclusion that where a prison disregards its 
own procedures and rejects an inmate’s otherwise procedurally 
defaulted complaint on the merits, the claim is “properly 
exhausted” under the PLRA.  
 
To be clear, and with sensitivity to the thoughtful 
concerns raise by our dissenting colleague, we do not today 
create any “broad . . . exception” to the exhaustion requirement.  
See Dissent at 8.  We simply reaffirm, as we held in Camp, that 
when an inmate’s allegations “have been fully examined on the 
merits” and “at the highest level,” they are, in fact, exhausted.  
219 F.3d at 281.  This holding also satisfies the “three 
interrelated objectives” of exhaustion: “(1) to return control of 
the inmate grievance process to prison administrators; (2) to 
encourage development of an administrative record, and 
perhaps settlements, within the inmate grievance process; and 
(3) to reduce the burden on the federal courts by erecting 
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barriers to frivolous prisoner lawsuits.”  Dissent at 8 (quoting 
Spruill, 372 F.3d at 230).  That is, precisely because we 
recognize that control over the grievance process is 
appropriately vested in prison administrators and that such 
administrators are best positioned to ascertain the need for 
further development of the administrative record, we should 
not be second-guessing their decisions on the relative 
efficiencies of (a) rejecting a claim and requiring it to be re-
initiated at the institution level, versus (b) opting to research it, 
to the extent needed, at the appellate level and addressing it on 
the merits.  And when the prison chooses the latter course, as 
it did here, making clear with its merits decision what the 
inevitable result would be of a re-initiated claim, then treating 
the claim as exhausted does not increase “the burden on the 
federal courts.”  Spruill, 372 F.3d at 230.  It simply avoids 
subjecting prisoners and prison administrators alike to a futile 
exercise and provides judicial review of the prison’s final 
decision on the merits.  In short, where the prison has chosen 
to forgo a rejection on procedural grounds and has elected to 
research, analyze, and deny a claim on the merits, both the 
purposes of exhaustion—and exhaustion itself—are satisfied. 
 
 In reaching this conclusion, we are in good company.  
Other Courts of Appeals too have held that merits review 
satisfies exhaustion under the PLRA and that, because PLRA 
exhaustion turns on the remedies and grievance procedures that 
the particular prison has available, treating a claim as 
exhausted where a prison chooses not to enforce those 
procedures does not contravene the PLRA.  See Reyes v. Smith, 
810 F.3d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 2016); Whatley v. Warden, Ware 
State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205, 1215 (11th Cir. 2015); Hammett 
v. Cofield, 681 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); 
Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011); Reed-Bey 
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v. Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322, 325 (6th Cir. 2010); Ross v. 
County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 2004).14 
 
 In sum, because Rinaldi’s Assault Request was denied 
at the highest level on the merits and therefore was properly 
exhausted under the PLRA, we will vacate the District Court’s 
dismissal of Rinaldi’s Eighth Amendment claim.   
 
B. Rinaldi’s FTCA Claim 
 
The District Court construed Rinaldi’s claim that the 
Government “forc[ed] him to reside with an inmate that [the 
                                                          
14 The Dissent argues that “most of our sister circuits to 
consider the issue addressed grievances the substance of which 
had proceeded through each step of the administrative 
process,” Dissent at 10, and, specifically, that the Ninth Circuit 
“qualified its holding on this point.”  Dissent at 11 (citing 
Reyes, 810 F.3d at 658).  But the fact that other Courts of 
Appeals have determined that exhaustion is satisfied when an 
otherwise procedurally-defaulted grievance is denied on the 
merits after having been adjudicated at each step of a grievance 
process does not speak to whether exhaustion is also satisfied 
when such a grievance is denied on the merits at the highest 
level of that grievance process.  Moreover, the legal analysis 
underlying those decisions—namely, their focus on whether 
“[p]rison officials have had the opportunity to address the 
grievance and correct their own errors,” Reyes, 810 F.3d at 
657—applies here with equal force.  Here too, the BOP had the 
opportunity to adjudicate Rinaldi’s claim in any way it saw fit, 
and opted to address it on the merits rather than direct him to 
comply with all levels of its 4-Step process. 
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BOP] knew, or should have known, had expressed an intention 
to kill [him],” Rinaldi, 2015 WL 2131208, at *5, as “essentially 
a negligence” claim under the FTCA subject to dismissal on 
the basis of the discretionary function exception.15  Id.  We will 
affirm.   
 
 The FTCA offers a limited waiver of the federal 
government’s sovereign immunity from civil liability for 
negligent acts of government employees acting within the 
scope of their employment.  Berkovitz v. United States, 486 
U.S. 531, 536 (1988); 28 U.S.C.  §§ 2671–2680.  However, it 
excludes claims “based upon the exercise or performance or 
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or 
duty . . . whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”  Id. 
§ 2680(a).  To determine whether a claim fails within this 
discretionary function exception, we apply a two-prong test.  
See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991); 
Mitchell v. United States, 225 F.3d 361, 363 (3d Cir. 2000).  
First, we ask whether the challenged conduct involved an 
“element of judgment or choice,” which depends on whether 
there is a “federal statute, regulation, or policy [that] 
specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to 
                                                          
 15 To the extent Rinaldi argues the discretionary 
function exception cannot apply because his allegations relate 
to unconstitutional acts, he fails to recognize the premise of the 
FTCA claim he seeks on appeal to reinstate: The FTCA only 
waives sovereign immunity for torts recognized under the law 
of the state in which the conduct was alleged to have occurred.  
Although Rinaldi referenced the Eighth Amendment, the 
District Court reasonably construed his claim as an FTCA 
claim, and it is that claim that Rinaldi now argues was 
erroneously dismissed.  See Rinaldi, 2015 WL 2131208, at *5. 
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follow.”  Mitchell, 225 F.3d at 363 (citation omitted).  Second, 
if the act does involve judgment, we ask whether the judgment 
involved is “the kind that the discretionary function 
exception was designed to shield.”  Id. (citations omitted).   
 
 Although we have not previously addressed in a 
precedential opinion whether BOP housing and cellmate 
assignments meet this test, other Courts of Appeals have held 
uniformly that they do.  See Montez ex rel. Estate of Hearlson 
v. United States, 359 F.3d 392, 396–98 (6th Cir. 
2004); Santana-Rosa v. United States, 335 F.3d 39, 43–44 (1st 
Cir. 2003); Cohen v. United States, 151 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th 
Cir. 1998); Dykstra v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 140 F.3d 791, 
795–96 (8th Cir. 1998); Calderon v. United States, 123 F.3d 
947, 948–50 (7th Cir. 1997).16  We now join them.  
  
 Here, both prongs of the discretionary function test are 
satisfied.  At the first prong, housing and cellmate assignments 
unquestionably involve an “element of judgment or choice,” 
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322 (citation omitted), for while BOP 
officials must “provide suitable quarters” and “provide for the 
protection, instruction, and discipline of all” of its inmates, 18 
U.S.C. § 4042(a)(2)-(3), neither that provision nor any other 
                                                          
 16 Cf. Ashford v. United States, 511 F.3d 501, 505 (5th 
Cir. 2007) (observing that the discretionary function exception 
generally applies to cellmate assignments when an inmate can 
“point to no specific prison policy or regulation that 
constrained prison officials’ judgment other than the prison’s 
general duty to protect its prison population,” but conceding 
the exception did not apply in that case because “there [was] a 
specific policy in place that constrained the decision-making 
ability of the prison officials”).   
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“federal statute, regulation or policy” can be said to 
“specifically prescribe[] a course of action” for such 
assignments that BOP officials must follow.  Mitchell, 225 
F.3d at 363 (citation omitted).  And at the second prong, “a 
prison’s internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left to 
the discretion of prison administrators,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 
452 U.S. 337, 350 (1981), and “[p]rison administrators . . . 
should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and 
execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are 
needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain 
institutional security.”  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 
(1979).  Thus, the District Court correctly concluded that 
housing and cellmate assignments are “of the kind that 
the discretionary function exception was designed to 
shield.”  Mitchell, 225 F.3d at 363 (citation omitted).  
   
V.  Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate and remand 
for further proceedings concerning Rinaldi’s First and Eighth 
Amendment claims and will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment in all other respects. 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part 
 
I join the Majority’s thoughtful analysis of Rinaldi’s 
Federal Tort Claims Act claim and exhaustion of his First 
Amendment claim under the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(PLRA). I write separately on the PLRA’s exhaustion 
requirement, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), as it relates to Rinaldi’s 
Eighth Amendment claim.  
 
Rinaldi—a federal inmate—alleges that prison officials 
unconstitutionally retaliated against him by forcing him to cell 
with an inmate who had threatened to kill him. See U.S. Const. 
amends. I, VIII. Despite conceding his failure to comply with 
applicable administrative remedy procedures as required by 
§ 1997e(a), Rinaldi invokes separate reasons why his First and 
Eighth Amendment claims may be deemed exhausted and 
considered by the District Court.1 As to Rinaldi’s First 
                                              
1 In addition to the grievances at issue in this appeal, 
Rinaldi asserts he filed over 50 administrative remedy requests 
while housed at USP-Lewisburg. Based on some of these 
remedy requests, Rinaldi’s complaint alleged other civil rights 
violations related to his confinement, including that: his Fifth 
and Eighth Amendment rights were violated when officials 
denied him access to adequate recreation; the denial of his 
ability to worship in congregation violated his right to religious 
freedom; and being forced to have psychological review 
conducted through his cell door resulted in him being denied 
proper medical care and violated his right to confidentiality 
with his doctor. 
The District Court found these claims administratively 
exhausted but concluded Rinaldi had failed to state claims for 
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Amendment claim, I agree with my colleagues that the serious 
threats of retaliation Rinaldi has alleged call into question the 
availability of exhaustion. But I believe the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016), and 
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006), counsels a different 
result in Rinaldi’s Eighth Amendment claim. 
 
The Supreme Court has strictly interpreted § 1997e(a), 
and the Court’s most recent analysis of exhaustion in Ross 
counsels against a broad articulation of a merits exception to 
proper exhaustion. I recognize the well-established exceptions 
to exhaustion in habeas corpus and administrative law. But in 
Ross, the Court made clear that the PLRA’s statutory 
exhaustion provision “stands on different footing” from judge-
made exhaustion doctrines. 136 S. Ct. at 1857. Looking to the 
history and purposes of the PLRA’s statutory exhaustion 
requirement, I believe exhaustion under the PLRA requires the 
substance of a grievance be considered on the merits at each 
available step of the administrative review process. Because 
Rinaldi failed to present his Eighth Amendment claim until 
midway through the administrative review process, the District 
Court was correct to dismiss the claim on exhaustion grounds. 
                                              
inadequate access to adequate recreation and inadequate 
psychological treatment. Rinaldi does not appeal that decision. 
Furthermore, as noted by the Majority, our decision in Mack v. 
Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 305 (3d Cir. 2016) 
forecloses Rinaldi’s Free Exercise claim and I agree Rinaldi 
should not be permitted leave to amend his Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act claim because this request was raised for the 
first time in Rinaldi’s Reply Brief. 
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I. 
 As the Majority Opinion explains, the United States 
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has a multi-tiered administrative 
remedy program. To exhaust administrative remedies, an 
inmate must first file an informal remedy request through an 
appropriate institution staff member via a BP-8 form. See 28 
C.F.R. § 542.13. If the inmate is not satisfied with the informal 
remedy response, he is required to address his complaint at the 
institutional level with the Warden via a BP-9. See § 542.14. If 
the inmate is dissatisfied with the Warden’s response, he may 
then appeal to the Regional Director via a BP-10. See § 542.15. 
And if dissatisfied with the Regional Director’s response, the 
inmate must appeal to the General Counsel via a BP-11. See id. 
Once an inmate receives a response to his appeal from the 
General Counsel, after filing the administrative remedy request 
at all levels, his administrative remedies are deemed 
exhausted.2 See id. 
 
 Here, Rinaldi filed an informal remedy request on 
January 29, 2012, claiming to have been assaulted by a 
previous cellmate. Rinaldi requested that the institution 
discontinue its practice of forcing inmates to cell together 
regardless of compatibility because “[f]orced double celling 
creates a hostile environment and increases the incidence of 
assaults.” JA 164. The informal request was denied and Rinaldi 
                                              
2 An exception to the initial filing requirement at the 
institutional level exists “[i]f the inmate reasonably believes 
the issue is sensitive and the inmate’s safety or well-being 
would be placed in danger if the Request became known at the 
institution.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(d)(1). But this exception is 
relevant only to Rinaldi’s First Amendment claim.  
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filed Request for Administrative Remedy #675165 (BP-9). 
This request was denied by the Warden on the grounds that 
“[a]ll inmates are screened for compatibility prior to 
placement.” JA 165.  
 
Rinaldi appealed to the Northeast Regional Office. At 
this stage in the institutional review process (BP-10), Rinaldi 
introduced a new claim that, on February 2, 2012, he was celled 
with an inmate who had threatened to kill him. Rinaldi framed 
this as evidence that the Warden’s reason for denying his 
remedy request—that inmates are screened for compatibility—
was untrue, noting he had provided his case manager with the 
names of other inmates he “would like to cell with.” JA 167. 
The Regional Office denied his appeal, reasoning that inmate 
compatibility is considered and there was “no record of 
[Rinaldi] being assaulted by [his] previous or current 
cellmate.” JA 168. Rinaldi then appealed to the General 
Counsel, who denied the appeal and closed the case with the 
code “DNY.” 
 
Thereafter, Rinaldi filed suit in federal court, 
proceeding pro se. As relevant here, Rinaldi alleged that being 
forced to cell with an inmate who had threatened to kill him 
violated his Eighth Amendment rights. The District Court 
dismissed the claim for Rinaldi’s failure to exhaust because the 
BOP’s regulations prohibit an inmate from raising issues for 
the first time on appeal. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(b)(2). Rinaldi 
was permitted 30 days to file an amended complaint but instead 
filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied. 
Upon that denial, Rinaldi filed this timely appeal.  
 
Now represented by counsel, Rinaldi concedes 
procedural error because he never presented his current claim 
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to the institution (BP-8 and BP-9 levels).3 Indeed, Rinaldi has 
never claimed that he is pursuing on appeal the claim he raised 
at all levels of administrative review, namely that the 
institution should screen for compatibility because forced 
double celling increases the likelihood of assaults. Now, 
however, Rinaldi alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights 
were violated when, on February 2, 2012, he was celled with 
an inmate who had threatened to kill him and appeals the 
District Court’s decision that this specific allegation was not 
exhausted. Rinaldi argues the District Court erred in dismissing 
this claim because the Regional Director’s response (BP-10) 
addressed on the merits both the allegation he was assaulted by 
a previous cellmate and the allegation he was threatened by his 
subsequent cellmate.  
 
II. 
My colleagues conclude Rinaldi’s Eighth Amendment 
claim was exhausted because, even though he raised its factual 
predicate for the first time midway through the grievance 
process, his grievance was denied on the merits at the highest 
level. I disagree. The Supreme Court’s most recent analysis of 
the PLRA’s mandatory exhaustion requirement, in Ross, did 
not decide the question we face today. But Ross did signal the 
Court’s continued reluctance to tolerate broad exceptions to the 
PLRA’s statutory exhaustion requirement.  
 
Moreover, the Supreme Court explained in Ross that, 
under the PLRA, the question of exhaustion “in all cases is one 
                                              
3 As noted, at the BP-8 and BP-9 levels, review takes 
place within the specific institution. At the BP-10 and BP-11 
levels, review takes place at the regional and national level.    
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of statutory construction.” 136 S. Ct. at 1858 n.2. The statute’s 
origins counsel that the substance of a grievance must be 
addressed at every available level of the administrative review 
process. So too does the Supreme Court’s construction of 
§ 1997e(a)’s text and purpose. Woodford drew on principles of 
habeas and administrative law, but, as described below, this 
does not support a broad interpretation of a merits exception to 
proper exhaustion.4  
 
A. 
Central to the PLRA’s effort to “reduce the quantity and 
improve the quality of prisoner suits” was its exhaustion 
requirement. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). 
Applicable “irrespective of the forms of relief sought and 
offered through administrative avenues,” Booth v. Churner, 
532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001), the PLRA’s exhaustion 
requirement was designed to strengthen the “weak” exhaustion 
provision of its predecessor—the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), see Porter, 534 U.S. at 
523; see also Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1857–58 (discussing how “the 
history of the PLRA underscores the mandatory nature of its 
exhaustion regime”). The Supreme Court has “reject[ed] every 
attempt to deviate . . . from [§ 1997e(a)’s] textual mandate.” 
Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1857.  
                                              
4 Woodford’s reference to our decision in Spruill v. 
Gillis, 372 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2004), does not support the 
proposition that exhaustion is satisfied where a grievance is 
addressed on the merits only at the highest level of review. The 
Court was citing our first holding in Spruill—that the PLRA’s 
exhaustion provision included a procedural default component. 
See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 87 (citing Spruill, 372 F.3d at 230). 
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Most recently, in Ross, the Court considered a “special 
circumstances” exception to the exhaustion requirement. Id. at 
1856. Acting on the premise that the PLRA’s exhaustion 
requirement was “not absolute,” the Fourth Circuit found a 
prisoner’s failure to comply with applicable procedural 
requirements could be excused where the prisoner reasonably 
believed administrative remedies were exhausted. Id. The 
Court rejected the special circumstances exception, explaining 
that such an approach, “if applied broadly, would resurrect 
CRIPA’s scheme, in which a court could look to all the 
particulars of a case to decide whether to excuse a failure to 
exhaust available remedies.” Id. at 1858.  
 
In rejecting the special circumstances test, the Court 
clarified that “mandatory exhaustion statutes like the PLRA 
establish mandatory exhaustion regimes, foreclosing judicial 
discretion.” Id. at 1857. Thus, while “an exhaustion provision 
with a different text and history from § 1997e(a) might be best 
read to give judges the leeway to create exceptions or to itself 
incorporate standard administrative-law exceptions,” id. at 
1858 n.2, courts must look only to the statute, “using ordinary 
interpretive techniques,” id., when considering whether a 
grievance has been exhausted. Looking to the PLRA’s history, 
it appears applying broad exceptions from habeas and 
administrative law to § 1997e(a) would be contrary to the 
“invigorated” exhaustion scheme, see Porter, 534 U.S. at 524, 
created by Congress and enforced by Supreme Court 
precedent. 
 
B. 
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Requiring a decision on the merits at each available 
stage of the administrative process is, moreover, consistent 
with how the Supreme Court has construed § 1997e(a)’s text 
and the purposes of the PLRA’s exhaustion provision.  
 
In Woodford, the Court interpreted § 1997e(a) to require 
“proper exhaustion.” 548 U.S. at 84. This “means using all 
steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that 
the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” Id. at 90 
(internal quotations marks and citation omitted). The Court 
explained that “[t]he benefits of exhaustion can be realized 
only if the prison grievance system is given a fair opportunity 
to consider the grievance. The prison grievance system will not 
have such an opportunity unless the grievant complies with the 
system’s critical procedural rules.” Id. at 95. 
 
This construction would appear to be inconsistent with 
a broad merits exception. This is not a case where the grievance 
bears some procedural defect, but the substance of the 
grievance is nevertheless considered at all administrative steps 
(for example, the initial filing was untimely or an appeal 
deadline was missed but these errors were overlooked). In such 
a case, the prisoner has used all steps the agency holds out, 
complying with the agency’s “critical rules,” and the 
administrative remedy system functions effectively as if no 
defect were present. But here, Rinaldi raised the factual basis 
for his current Eighth Amendment claim only midway through 
the grievance process. 
 
As for the PLRA, we have described the “three 
interrelated objectives” of exhaustion as follows: “(1) to return 
control of the inmate grievance process to prison 
administrators; (2) to encourage development of an 
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administrative record, and perhaps settlements, within the 
inmate grievance process; and (3) to reduce the burden on the 
federal courts by erecting barriers to frivolous prisoner 
lawsuits.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230 (3d Cir. 2004). 
The Supreme Court has reasoned, in Woodford, that exhaustion 
gives the agency “an opportunity to correct its own mistakes 
with respect to the programs it administers,” 548 U.S. at 89, 
and promotes efficiency—“[a] prisoner who does not want to 
participate in the prison grievance system will have little 
incentive to comply with the system’s procedural rules unless 
noncompliance carries a sanction,” id. at 95. These purposes 
are best served by requiring that the substance of the grievance 
be addressed at every available stage of the administrative 
process. 
 
 Take, for example, the goal of developing an 
administrative record. If the procedural defect is that an inmate 
interjects a claim at the final stage of the BOP’s remedy 
process, then a denial with the code “DNY” would suffice to 
have exhausted that claim on the merits.5 In this scenario there 
is no creation of an administrative record. The administrative 
record is also not fully developed where, as here, a claim is 
interjected midway through the BOP’s review process. As for 
compliance with critical procedural rules, there is less 
incentive for a prisoner to pursue separate grievances through 
all stages of review if a claim (or, as here, facts supporting a 
different claim) can instead potentially be added at the final 
hurdle. Finally, requiring a grievance to have been considered 
on the merits at all available stages of review makes it more 
                                              
5 The status codes used by the BOP relating to 
administrative remedies distinguish between appeals that are 
closed on the merits and those that are rejected. 
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likely a particular institution will have the full opportunity to 
address and correct a grievance because the institution itself 
will be put on notice first. The first step of the BOP’s remedy 
program is designed to allow staff an opportunity to 
“informally resolve the issue before an inmate submits a 
Request for Administrative Remedy.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a) 
(emphasis added).6 
C. 
Analogies to well-established exceptions in habeas and 
administrative law are useful. But the Supreme Court has not 
                                              
6 The Majority asserts its approach “avoids subjecting 
prisoners and prison administrators alike to a futile exercise 
and provides judicial review of the prison’s final decision on 
the merits.” Maj. Op. at 24. But the PLRA was enacted to 
“improve the quality of prisoner suits,” Porter, 534 U.S. at 
524, and its primary vehicle for doing so was to require proper 
exhaustion, see Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90.  
 
As Rinaldi concedes, his Eighth Amendment claim 
should have been filed separately under the BOP’s regulations 
because it involves a separate issue. See 28 C.F.R. 
542.14(c)(2); 542.15(b)(2). Indeed, Rinaldi never presented his 
Eighth Amendment claim at the institutional level—that is, to 
the prison officials at Lewisburg. When a grievance such as 
Rinaldi’s is not presented at the institutional level, prison 
officials are stripped of the opportunity to address prisoner 
grievances within their institution. And we—as an eventual 
reviewing court—lose the benefit of the expertise and 
specialized knowledge possessed by those who staff the 
institution. Such an approach does not serve to “improve the 
quality” of suits before us.      
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imported all of these principles into the PLRA’s exhaustion 
regime.7 Further still, these exceptions are judge-made.8 To the 
extent they apply in the PLRA context, Ross requires 
consideration of § 1997e(a)’s origins, text, and purpose. As 
noted, I believe these considerations counsel that the substance 
of a grievance must have been considered on the merits at each 
available level of administrative review.  
                                              
7 For example, in Woodford, the Court rejected a 
comparison between the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) tolling provision and the PLRA, 
noting “the AEDPA and PLRA provisions deal with separate 
issues: tolling in the case of the AEDPA and exhaustion in the 
case of the PLRA,” 548 U.S. at 100, and further stated it was 
“unrealistic to infer from the wording of the PLRA provision 
that Congress framed and adopted that provision with habeas 
law and not administrative law in mind,” id. at 102.   
8 As we noted in Spruill, “the Supreme Court has 
consistently located the procedural default component of 
federal habeas law in the independent and adequate state 
ground doctrine, a doctrine that, in the habeas context at least, 
is grounded in concerns of comity and federalism.” 372 F.3d 
at 229 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). These 
concerns apply “with greater force to defaults in state judicial 
proceedings than . . . to defaults in state administrative 
proceedings,” id. at 229, and this is even more true in the PLRA 
context where the administrative proceedings are federal.  
In the administrative law context, the D.C. Circuit has 
explained exhaustion is a “judicially-created doctrine . . . 
which permits courts some discretion to waive exhaustion.” 
Washington Ass’n for Television & Children v. F.C.C., 712 
F.2d 677, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  
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III. 
 Notably, most of our sister circuits to consider the issue 
prior to Ross addressed grievances the substance of which had 
proceeded through each step of the administrative process. See, 
e.g., Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 125 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(concerning a late initial filing accepted and decided on the 
merits); Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 721 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(“Maddox’s grievance was rejected on the merits at every stage 
of review without any indication from prison officials that it 
was procedurally deficient.”); Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller, 603 
F.3d 322, 325 (6th Cir. 2010) (addressing an inmate’s failure 
to name a single individual in his initial grievance); Ross v. Cty. 
of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 2004) (“If a 
prison accepts a belated filing, and considers it on the merits, 
that step makes the filing proper.”).9 This is also true of our 
decision in Spruill. See 372 F.3d at 232 (focusing on the fact 
that the prison’s initial grievance review cured the inmate’s 
procedural defect). 
 
 In fact, the Ninth Circuit in Reyes v. Smith expressly 
qualified its holding on this point: “we hold that a prisoner 
exhausts ‘such administrative remedies as are available,’ under 
the PLRA despite failing to comply with a procedural rule if 
prison officials ignore the procedural problem and render a 
decision on the merits of the grievance at each available step 
of the administrative process.” 810 F.3d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 
                                              
9 The one exception is Whatley v. Warden, Ware State 
Prison, but even in Whatley, the inmate’s first informal 
grievance referred back to an earlier grievance containing the 
substantive allegations that later formed the basis of his appeals 
and complaint. See 802 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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2016) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Eighth 
Circuit also based its holding in Hammett v. Cofield on the fact 
that the inmate had “pursued the[] grievances through all three 
steps of the process” and his grievance appeals were denied on 
the merits. 681 F.3d 945, 948 (8th Cir. 2012). The court noted 
that when a grievance has proceeded through all steps, 
notwithstanding an initial procedural error, “[a] complete 
administrative record exists, and a reviewing court will have 
the benefit of the agency’s institutional perspective.” Id. at 
947–48. This reasoning does not hold true where a claim has 
been added midway through the remedy process.  
 
IV. 
Exhaustion provisions, like § 1997e(a), are designed “to 
give the agency a fair and full opportunity to adjudicate [party] 
claims.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. In the PLRA context, I 
believe this requires the substance of a grievance to have been 
considered at every level of available administrative review. 
For this reason, Rinaldi did not exhaust his Eighth Amendment 
claim and I respectfully dissent from that holding of the 
Majority Opinion. 
